According to several extended behavioral theories, value profits should mirror momentum profits, and vary over time. We test these theories in the cross section of returns. Value returns depend on market states. From 1926 to 2018, following DOWN market return, the average so-called value premium is about three time its unconditional counterpart, whereas it appears to vanish following UP market returns. Moreover, several short episodes of extreme losses in momentum strategy (momentum crashes) are contemporaneous with extreme value profits (value bubbles). Our results are robust to various time varying risk-based explanations.
I. Introduction
Why do contrarian (value) investors outperform the market? This question is part of the ongoing debate on market efficiency. For rational expectation advocates, it appears at first to represent a persisting anomaly, because according to conventional wisdom, during economic downturns equity investors intuitively seek refuge in "value" stocks they consider relatively "safe haven" assets. Early empirical evidence (Chung and Charoenwong (1991) ), as well as the model predictions of Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003) tend to confirm this traditional view and show that assets in place are indeed less risky than Growth stocks. In their seminal paper on value investment Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) analyze thoroughly the risk hypothesis of the superior return earned by stocks with high "long run" (or book) value relative to current market value. They look at the frequency of superior performance as well as their performance in bad states of the world when the marginal utility of wealth is high and find little if any support for the view that value strategies are fundamentally riskier.
Meanwhile, several important works mitigate this early empirical evidence. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) disentangle the market risk into permanent cash-flow shocks to the market (bad beta) and temporary shocks to market discount rates (good beta), where investors should care more about the former than the latter and demand a higher price to bear such bad beta risk. They find that value stocks have relatively high bad betas w.r.t market cash flow shocks. Furthermore, Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009) strengthen the result of Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and provide evidence that firms' systematic risks (measured as the co-movements of Value and Growth stocks) are determined by the properties of their cash flows. Petkova and Zhang (2005) also provide evidence in a time-varying risk setting, that value stocks tend to co-vary negatively with the expected market risk premium, although not sufficiently to explain the magnitude of the value premium in the context of the conditional capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Their risk-based arguments, indeed, coincide with the model of Zhang (2005) who relies on costly reversibility and counter-cyclical price of risk to explain the value premium.
For behaviorists however, the story is different. The main argument for the value premium, is that contrarian (value) investors bet against "naive" investors who may either overreact to news, extrapolate past earnings growth too far in the future, or assume trends in stock prices (Lakonishok et al. (1994) ). Whatever the reason, naive investors will tend to follow positive feedback (momentum) strategies, buying when prices rise and selling when prices fall. Whether all momentum traders are really "naive" or on the contrary some of them are strategic investors who anticipate future trends in the stock prices, because they recognize the presence of other investors who tend to extrapolate past changes in prices, value stock returns should therefore increase (decrease) the less (more) aggressive become momentum trades. Put differently, according to behavioral theory, a decrease (increase) in momentum trades dampen (strengthen) the selling (buying) pressure from momentum traders on underpriced (overpriced) stocks whose have very likely performed badly (well) in the past, augmenting therefore the profit of values strategists who constantly invest disproportionally (under-invest) in these stocks. While, the dynamic of momentum strategies has been studied to test behavioral models (Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) , Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013) ) the dynamics of value strategies from a behavioral standpoint have not attracted much attention. We believe it is crucial to fill this gap. In particular, nowadays where a strong time-varying component in the momentum strategies has been identified. Loosely speaking, since "momentum crashes" have been observed (Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) , Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) ),"value bubbles"
should also have occurred according to the behavioral theory. The goal of this paper is to test this hypothesis. Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013) are the first to our knowledge to establish a link between value and momentum premia. They discover significant co-movements in value and momentum strategies across diverse asset classes and also a negative correlation between value and momentum within and across asset classes. While they admit that their findings challenge both existing rational and behavioral asset pricing theories, the negative correla-tion between value and momentum strategy might not be so disconnected from established behavioral theories. Beyond the the argument of Lakonishok et al. (1994) stated above, the negative correlation between value and momentum returns is predicted, by several pioneering behavioral theories (De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) , Vishny (1998),Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) , Barberis and Shleifer (2003) ), although maybe more subtly for some of them. While the observation that under-performance of momentum strategies profits contrarian investors is straightforwardly predicted by (De Long et al. (1990) ,and Barberis and Shleifer (2003)) 1 , overreaction theories which rely on specific behavioral biases need to be extended to account for changes in investor sentiment.
In the model of Daniel et al. (1998) investors are indeed overconfident about their private information and also display a self-attribution bias. It creates overreaction to their initial private signal and leads to continuous overreaction on average following subsequent public signals 2 . Continuous overreaction leads therefore to positive auto-correlation and subsequent repeated public information arrival to reversal. Since confirming public news furthers the initial overreaction and pushes prices further away from their intrinsic value, the intensity of investors confidence also increases the time taken for mispriced stocks to revert back toward fundamentals. If we assume the intensity of overconfidence evolves according to market condition or market sentiment Cooper et al. (2004) , Antoniou et al. (2013) ,and in particular, that aggregate overconfidence should be greater following market gain (Daniel et al. (1998) , Gervais and Odean (2001) ), 3 we should be able to forecast periods when mispriced stocks return relatively quickly to their fundamentals, increasing, ceteris paribus, in these periods the return of value strategies.
Analogous reasoning might be applied to the other seminal model of investor sentiment proposed by Barberis et al. (1998) . They too, use concepts of psychology but the underpinning of their model is representativeness (Tversky and Kahneman (1974) ) and conservatism (Edwards (1968) ). Investor believes that the behavior of a given firm's earnings move be-tween mean reverting and trending "states" or "regimes" where in particular, the transition probabilities are fixed in the investor's mind. One can easily extend their model, depending on the state of the market. According to their theory, following persistent market declines, it is very likely that underpriced stocks have experienced a long series of negative earning shocks. Therefore, past overreaction should forecast superior return for these underpriced stocks in the subsequent period following persistent market decline. Moreover since the very nature of the human psychology dictates the exogenous model parameters and because, in aggregate, investors hold a long position in the equity market, it is not unrealistic to presume that conservatism increases following persistent market decline, increasing ceteris paribus the regime transition probabilities, dampening the further possible destabilization of underpriced stocks, increasing therefore in the same fashion as in the extension of Daniel et al.
(1998)'s model described above, the time it takes for mispriced stocks to revert back towards fundamentals.
We examine therefore the dynamic of value strategies through the lens of behavioral theories and test whether conditioning on the state of the market impacts substantially their profitability. In the same spirit as Cooper et al. (2004) , we define two states (1)"UP" is when the lagged two-year market return in non negative, and (2)"DOWN" is when the lagged two-year market return is negative. We find that the most significant part of value profit is realized following DOWN periods. Then we identify episodes when payoffs of value strategies are extreme, find that they are contemporaneous with momentum strategy crashes.
Employing conditional market models, we also highlight the option-like behavior of value strategies. Finally we confront rational and behavioral theories of the value effect and find that our finding can hardly be rationalized using risk-based approaches.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II details the methodology and presents the value profits in the short-run and long-run across UP and DOWN market states.
Section III presents the so-called mirror effect between momentum crashes and extreme value gains, and performs robustness checks. Armed with our new insight on value dynamics, we re-investigate the time-varying risk-based explanations of the value premium. Finally, Section IV concludes the paper.
II. Value Profits Across States

A. Methodology
The data for this section includes all ordinary common shares on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (CRSP monthly files, sharecodes 10 and 11 only). Our sample commences in July 1926 and extends through June 2018. We use value-weighted decile portfolios returns sorted on B/M equity ratios and on D/P ratios from the Kenneth French data library. We follow a similar methodology to Cooper et al. (2004) to monitor the market state dependent investment strategies. As discussed in the introduction, extended behavioral theories predict that aggregate market returns might have merely opposite impacts on value and momentum strategies. This methodology allows us also to remain consistent when comparing with market state conditional momentum strategies.
In each month t, we identify the state of the market as the return on the CRSP value weight index (including dividend) over the 24 months prior to t. The test-period profits are calculated for four holding periods,t + 1 to t + 6, t + 1 to t + 12, t + 13 to t + 48, and t + 49 to t + 84. These fairly arbitrary choices of holding periods aim at assessing the impact of the aggregate market return on value investing for different horizons. Ranging from a somewhat immediate (six months), to a long-run (3 to 5 years) impact. We construct zerocost strategies in taking long positions in value stocks and short positions in growth stocks.
We construct 84 time-series of monthly row profits, where the profit on each holding period month k, for k=1,2,...,84 in calendar month t is the difference of the highest decile portfolio and the lowest decile portfolios HM L k,t (whether portfolios are sorted on B/M or D/P).
We then regress each time-series on value weighted market index over the one month T-Bill return as a proxy of market excess return, and a constant to form the CAPM risk-adjusted profits.
whereβ k is the estimated loading of the time-series of raw profits in holding-period-month k on excess market return r M,t − r f,t . And then, to form the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the holding period, we accumulate raw and CAPM-adjusted profits:
where HM L * is either (HM L k,t+k ) or risk-adjusted (HM L adj kt ) and the (K 1 , K 2 ) pairs are (1,6), (1,12), (13, 48) , and (49, 84) respectively.
4 As discussed earlier, extended behavioral theories predict greater value profits following market losses. Therefore, we identify the state of the market at the beginning of each portfolio testing period. In order to have a substantial number of observations without sanctifying the quality of signal, we decide to monitor the realized market return for a period of 24 months. If the market's two-year return is non-negative(positive), we define the state of the market as "DOWN"("UP").
5
To test if the mean profits are equal to zero in each state respectively, we regress the time series of CARs on a DOWN variable and an UP dummy variable, with no intercept. To test if the mean value profits following UP and DOWN markets are equal, we regress the time series of CARSs on an DOWN dummy variable and an intercept. Since the times series of CARs are overlapping, We employ Newey-West variance estimator (Newey and West (1987)) that is robust to auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity of the residual, setting the number of lags equal to the number of overlapping months in the holding period window (5, 11, 35).
B. Value Effect: A State Dependent Anomaly
We first document in this section the effect of value strategies sorted on B/M equity, conditioning on the state of the market.The mean CARs for raw and CAPM-adjusted profit are reported in Table I for the portfolios formed in UP and DOWN markets, respectively.
During 1928:07 to 2018:06, following two-year DOWN market return, the raw profits in Panel A are statistically positive for value strategy during the first six months and twelve months, of the holding period and are very high: 1.77%, and 1.50%, respectively. Even during the next three years, while decreasing to 1.1%, the value premium remain about twice its unconditional counterpart (known to be roughly about half a percent). The CAPMadjusted profits in DOWN market are also statistically significant and positive during the first 4 years and range from a 1.29% to 0.60%. These results are in line with evidence from cognitive psychology since people are anchored in their beliefs, it takes time until they changes their prior beliefs, and the decrease (increase) in optimism /overconfidence (conservatism), inflating as a buy product the return on mispriced stocks.
The performance of the value strategy is, however, different following UP states. In Panel B, there is no evidence of value effect following UP state during the first six months of the holding period, and once controlling for the market risk, the value anomaly seems on average to vanish during all the four years following two-year non-DOWN market return.
The CAPM-adjusted alphas are indeed -0.2%, 0.05% and -0.15% for six month, 1 year, and 1 to 4 years horizons respectively.
In Panel C, we provide the t-statistics for testing the equality of the profits across DOWN and UP states for the four holding periods. Value profits are statistically greater following DOWN markets using both the raw and CAPM adjusted profits for the first six months and twelve months, of the holding period. So, value profits are greater in the short-run following DOWN markets than following UP markets, as predicted by the extended behavioral theories.
C. Long-Term Value, and Local Efficiency
Long run reversal of momentum strategies has been widely documented in the literature,Jegadeesh an (2001) , Lee and Swaminathan (2000) . However with the momentum approach only, it is difficult to discuss market efficiency in a broad sense. Because while some a priori mispriced Profits of the Value (HML-highest decile minus lowest decile) strategies sorted on book-to-market (B/M) equity ratios (where B/M equity portfolios are formed at the end of each of year n, based on the book equity for the last fiscal year end in n-1) are cumulated across four holding periods: months t + 1 to t + 6, months t + 1 to t + 12, months t + 13 to t + 48, and t + 49 to t + 84. Reported below are the mean monthly profits, and CAPM alphas, during 1929 to 2017. Panels A and B report the profits following DOWN and UP markets, respectively. Panel C reports the robust t-statistics (Newey and West (1987) ) for the test of the equality of profits across UP and DOWN markets. (N ) refers to the number of observation for each state.
stocks return to their fundamental values, it does not deter investors from overreacting to other news. Since we present some evidence that in negative state on average, value returns are particularly high, and given the result of Cooper et al. (2004) stating that in those particular states there is no clear evidence of momentum returns, from classical behavioral theories la Lakonishok et al. (1994) we might be tempted to conjecture that after a sufficiently long time of low momentum trades and high value returns that a good part of mispricing at the aggregate level might have been corrected. The long run pattern in value profits of Panel A
in Table I points toward that direction. Neither the raw returns nor the CAPM alphas are positively significant in the 4 to 7 years time horizon. However, if low value return following a steady average important value profit might point toward some local efficiency, the duration of stabilized market prices might not last long. In fact, if as reported in Table I, important value profits arise on average after a DOWN market state, given the well known cyclical behavior, these profits are likely to be contemporaneous with non-DOWN market return (see also Figure 2 ), impacting therefore positively investor optimism, and as a by-product increasing momentum profits (Cooper et al. (2004) 
III. Value Bubbles and Momentum Crashes
A. The Mirror Effect
As seen in the previous section, the momentum crash phenomenon might arise simultaneously with what we call value bubbles. Figure 2 highlights four value bubbles. We report the dollar value of investment following bear markets that last at least one year and half.
We define bear market when the market decrease by at least 20%, without a 20% rally, going back to 1927. We assume that following a sufficiently long lasting bear market, value strategies should, provide a particularly high returns, because of behavioral motives detailed in the introduction.
6 The return on losers stocks for a 12 months WML strategies are also depicted for the periods of interest. Whereas, according to the classical (static) momentum effect (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) We also display the rank of both portfolio returns (worst WML loss against best value gain), the contemporaneous market return and the two-year based market state. The analysis is performed over the period [01:1927, 10:2017] . Returns are expressed in percentages. Ranking is performed on the full sample.
B. A CAPM conditional on market states
Let us consider a first version of the conditional CAPM
where R t+1 , R m,t+1 are respectively the excess monthly returns on the asset at hand and the contemporaneous market return. 1 B,t is a bear market indicator, i.e. it the market return between time t − 2 years and time t is negative and 0 otherwise. From this set-up we deduce that according to model (3) the abnormal return during bull markets is α 0 and during bear market is α 0 + α B . Similarly the market β during bull markets is β 0 and β 0 + β B during bear markets. The estimated coefficients are displayed in Table III and reveal that the abnormal return of the value portfolio is 0.09% per month in bull markets against 0.87% per month in bear market. The β of the market portfolio is 1.23 and significant during bull markets and increases to 1.73 during bear markets. This indicates that the value portfolio is exposed to greater market risk when in bear markets, where the marginal utility of wealth is higher. This result is consistent with Zhang (2005) and would therefore comfort us in the idea that value stocks earn higher returns partly because they expose the investor to greater risk when in DOWN market states, where marginal utility of wealth is higher.
To analyze the source of this increased β we refine the conditional CAPM (3) by decomposing the β in DOWN market states into a "bounce β", where market state is negative but the contemporaneous market return is positive and a "drown" β where market state is negative and the contemporaneous market return is negative. Hence the model can be described by:
In conditional CAPM (4), β 0 is the asset β when in bull markets, i.e. the market state is positive, β 0 + β B corresponds to the β when in bear markets when the contemporaneous market return is negative while β 0 + β B + β B,U is the market β when the market state is negative and the contemporaneous market excess return is positive.
We display the estimation results of model (4) in Table IV . We can see that for the value portfolio, the β in UP market states is positive at 1.23 and significant. While analyzing the β of the value portfolio in negative market states, we decompose our analysis into two cases.
The first case is when in a DOWN market state the next month excess return is negative, then the β of the value portfolio is at 1.33, therefore no so different from the β in UP market states, albeit no so significant. However,it is striking to see that the bounce β of the value portfolio is 2.03 and significant. Hence we can see that conditional on DOWN market states, where the marginal utility of wealth is high, the market β of the value portfolio is higher in UP markets than in down markets. Hence, once conditioned on DOWN market states, the value portfolio has a lesser exposure to downside risk. It is as if conditional on DOWN market states, the Value portfolio behaves like a call option on the market. For clarity of presentation we aggregate the various components of β as per model (4) into a more compact version of β as in Table V . One can see that when in bull markets, the Value and Looser portfolio exhibit a significantly different alpha whereas during a bear market the alpha of both portfolio are rather close and their β in bear market and contemporaneous UP markets almost coincide. A similar analysis can be conducted when the market is in positive state (bull market). A model identical in structure to (4) can be written where we condition on a UP markets state:
The estimated coefficients are displayed in Table VI . We can see that in line with estimation III the β in negative market state β 0 is 1.73 and significant whereas the β conditioned on UP market states and down contemporaneous market β 0 + β L is 1.25. We can also see that the β coefficient in UP market states and positive contemporaneous market returns
, which is essentially unchanged compared to the previous case. Hence, we deduce that conditional on UP market states, Value stocks are exposed almost equivalently to the downside risk and the upside risk.
Value (1) Value (2) Growth (1) Growth (2) WML (1) This table displays the regression coefficients of an unconditional CAPM against the coefficients of a CAPM conditioned on DOWN market states. We chose a two year market lag to define our market state. For the unconditional CAPM α 0 , β 0 represent the standard CAPM coefficients. For the conditioned CAPM, α 0 , β 0 represent the CAPM coefficients on UP market states whereas α 0 + α B , β 0 + β B represent the CAPM coefficients on DOWN market states. The analysis is performed over the period [01:1927, 10:2017] .
Value (1) Value (2) Growth (1) Growth (2) and contemporaneous up market This table displays the regression coefficients of a unconditional CAPM against the coefficients of a CAPM conditioned on UP market states and contemporaneous up markets. The conditioned CAPM analyzes the structure of β according to the market state and to whether the contemporaneous market return is positive or negative. We chose a two year market lag to define our market state. For the unconditional CAPM α 0 , β 0 represent the standard CAPM coefficients. For the conditioned CAPM, α 0 , β 0 represent the CAPM coefficients on DOWN market states whereas α 0 +α L represent the CAPM coefficients on UP market states while β 0 + β L corresponds to the CAPM β coefficient on UP market states and negative contemporaneous market returns. Last, β 0 +β L +β L,U represents the CAPM β conditioned on UP market states and positive contemporaneous market returns. The analysis is performed over the period [01:1927, 10:2017] . (5) according to market state and contemporaneous market evolution for value, losers and winners portfolio. α Bear , α Bull represent the portfolio conditional α when the market is respectively in negative states and positive states. β Bear represents the portfolio βinDOW N marketstatewhileβ Bull,Down and β Bull,U p refer to the portfolio β in positive states and during down and up contemporaneous market,respectively. The analysis is performed over the period [01:1927, 10:2017] . Data on value returns are ranked by B/M deciles. All data are extracted from Kenneth French's web site.
Value Loosers Winners
However, as noted in Petkova and Zhang (2005) , the realized market return we have used so far is a noisy measure of the market state because the ex-post and ex-ante market returns are correlated. They instead propose a measure of market state based on the relative level of the estimated market premium to its historical average. In the next sub-section we test for the robustness of our results on mirror effects and conditional downside risk using this alternative measure of market state.
C. Market States as Estimated Market Premium
As in Petkova and Zhang (2005) we regress the realized excess market return between time t and t+1 on the known dividend yield, default spread, the term spread and the risk-free rate known at time t :
where DY t , DS t , T S t , T B f,t represent respectively the dividend yield, the default spread, the term spread and the 3 month treasury rate.
This implies that the estimated risk premium is:
After estimating coefficients ( a i ) 0≤i≤4 , we compute the average risk premium γ on the full sample and since the risk premium is contra-cyclical we characterize a UP market state with the condition γ t < γ, and DOWN market state otherwise. We start by estimating a conditional CAPM similar to:
where the market state is determined as by the level of the estimated risk premium relative to its historical average.
We display the results of estimated coefficients of model (8) in Table VIII The results are qualitatively similar to the ones using the past realized return as market states: in bear market states the risk w.r.t market increases for Value stocks since β increases from 1.01
(positive states) to 1.74 (negative states) whereas for growth stocks β only increases by 0.49.
We display the estimated coefficients of (9) in Table IX . We can see that conclusions are different here since effectively when in DOWN market state, and along a down contemporaneous market return, the Value portfolio β increases by 0.42 whereas the Growth portfolio β increases shows only a marginal increase of 0.13. When the market bounces, both portfolio β increase by roughly the same amount (0, 57 for Value and 0.64 for Growth) which has only a marginal effect on the Value minus Growth portfolio. Hence these results contradicts previ-ous results obtained on the market state based on past returns. To clinch these contradictory results we construct a hybrid market state composed of these look-back and look-forward market states. We propose the following categories: when both market states are negative, or both are positive then the combined market state is negative, resp. positive. When the two market states contradict each other we deem the market to be neutral. According to this classification of market states we design the following model: (10) α 0 represents the abnormal return in UP market states while α 0 + α B , α 0 + α N represent the abnormal return in negative market states, resp. neutral market state. Similarly β 0 represents the β of the portfolio in UP market state whereas β 0 + β N represents the β of the portfolio in neutral market state. β 0 + β B represents the β in DOWN market states and down contemporaneous markets while β 0 + β B + β B,U is the β in DOWN market states and up contemporaneous markets. We report in Table XI the estimated coefficients of model (10). The resulting picture is not as clear as when we were using the realized market return as market state since when the market state becomes negative we see that the β of the Value portfolio whether in up or down contemporaneous market (+0.93 versus 0.73) while the β of the Growth portfolio decreases in both instances. However, it seems conditional on DOWN market states the Value portfolio seems significantly more exposed to upside risk than downside risk while the opposite effect is not that pronounced for the Growth portfolio.
Furthermore when we look at the existence of a mirror effect in our three state framework, which we report in Table X For the conditional CAPM, α 0 , β 0 represent the CAPM coefficients on UP market states whereas α 0 + α N , β 0 + β N represent the CAPM coefficients on neutral market states. β 0 + β B corresponds to the CAPM β coefficient on DOWN market states and down contemporaneous market return while β 0 + β B + β B,U corresponds to the CAPM β coefficient on DOWN market states and up contemporaneous market. The analysis is performed over the period [01:1927, 10:2017] . Data on dividend yields are extracted from CRSP database. Data on default spreads are extracted from Moody's database. Data on term spreads are coming from Robert Schiller's and Kenneth French's web site.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We demonstrate that the profits of value strategies depend heavily on the state of the market. Risk adjusted value strategies are not profitable following period of market gains, and the monthly value premium is on average three time the unconditional monthly value premium. Our findings are consistent with several extended classical overreactions theories, as well as with the behavioral claim of Lakonishok et al. (1994) where positive feedback traders are trading against contrarian investors coupled with the evidence reported by Cooper et al. (2004) of strong momentum profits following period of market losses. We provide evidence of episodes of extreme value profits contemporaneous with market rebound in time of market distress. We call theses episodes value bubbles. We provide evidence that value bubbles mirror momentum crashes (Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) , Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) ).
Moreover, we show that for various measures of market states, based on past market returns or a hybrid state constructed from past market returns and the expected market risk premium, value stocks behave like long call options on the market. Contrary to the observations of Petkova and Zhang (2005) we show that the value premium is hardly solely explained by risk-based arguments. Conditioning on DOWN market states, when marginal utility of wealth is high, value stocks appear not to be riskier than growth stocks. Indeed, value stock betas only increase when contemporaneous market returns are positive and are otherwise identical to UP market state betas. In their model a decrease in momentum trades will exacerbate the profit of "passive" investors even more than the predictions Lakonishok et al. (1994) since it will deter rational investors to excessively overreact to news in anticipation of less momentum trades, while Barberis and Shleifer (2003) develop a model where investors categorize risky assets in styles (momentum, value portfolios etc...) and move funds in these styles relative to past performance, therefore when momentum returns fad momentum traders switch style (value stocks), inflating value returns.
2 Since biased investors tend to attribute confirming public news to their own skill and dis-confirming public information to luck, overconfidence about previous private signal will increase following confirming news, intensifying overreaction, whereas confidence tend to remain constant following dis-confirming news.
3 Because investor in aggregate hold long position in the equity market, increases in market prices will tend to be attributed unduly to investor skill and will result in greater overconfidence.
4 the CAR performance metric is similar to ones employed by Titman (1993), andCooper et al. (2004) . 5 We also consider a one-year and three-year definition of the market's state, and also that market excess return over risk free rate instead of market state return and result are robust.
6 In that period if we follow Daniel et al. (1998) , aggregate overconfidence should be low (lower overreaction) or according Barberis et al. (1998) conservatism increases, inflating therefore values returns.
